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This dissertation aims at improving the understanding of the relation between 
innovation investment, financial constraints and capital structure in the context of 
emerging economies. Since early 1930s, economists have argued that innovation is 
essential for firm survival, economic growth and development. An independent strand 
of the literature demonstrates that innovation by firms is a key driver of economic 
growth. Meanwhile, people also recognized that innovation investment is difficult to 
finance in a competitive marketplace due to various factors such as taxes, transaction 
costs, and especially informational asymmetries with external investors. Therefore, 
financing of innovation becomes an important managerial and policy challenge.  
A lot of studies have focused on identifying the financial constraints related to risky 
R&D and innovation investments. Nevertheless, there is little research highlighting the 
mechanisms that different external financing sources can affect innovation activities 
differently. Moreover, the implications of innovation investment for future capital 
structure decisions have not been fully analyzed. I try to shed light on these issues using 
micro evidence in the context of emerging markets, where financial markets, political 
systems and economic systems are different than those in the industrialized economies 
such as the US. 
Both of the chapters imply the importance of equity financing on innovation 
investment in developing countries especially for those young, small and private firms. 
The finding points to the significance of the private equity market for financing of 
innovation in the emerging economy context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation aims at improving the understanding of the relation between 
innovation, financial constraints and capital structure in the context of emerging 
economies. Since early 1930s (Schumpeter 1939), economists have argued that 
innovation is essential for firm survival, economic growth and development. An 
independent strand of the literature demonstrates that innovation by firms is a key 
driver of economic growth (Aghion and Howitt 2006). Meanwhile, people also 
recognized that innovation investment is difficult to finance in a competitive 
marketplace (Schumpeter 1942, Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Hall 2005) due to various 
factors such as taxes, transaction costs, and especially informational asymmetries with 
external investors. Therefore, financing of innovation becomes an important 
managerial and policy challenge.  
A lot of studies have focused on identifying the financial constraints related to 
risky R&D and innovation investments. Nevertheless, there is little research 
highlighting the mechanisms that different external financing sources can affect 
innovation activities differently. Moreover, the implications of innovation investment 
for future capital structure decisions have not been analyzed. I try to shed light on 
these issues using micro evidence in the context of emerging markets, where financial 
markets, political systems and economic systems are different than those in the 
industrialized economies such as the US.  
In Chapter 1, I investigate the relationship between firms’ capital structure and 
innovation decisions in a large sample of firms in East Asian, South Asian, Central 
Asian and Eastern European emerging economies. I argue that access to external 
financial resources plays a critical role for financially constrained firms. My dataset 
enables more detailed analyses of different sources of external finance than previous 
studies. To resolve the causality problem, I utilize instrumental-variable methods for 
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identification.  
 The empirical analyses demonstrate that the broad set of primarily privately-held 
firms in my sample significantly benefit from external finance for innovation activities. 
Not only equity finance but also funding from family and friends are significant 
enablers of innovation activity, whereas I do not find a significant relationship 
between debt finance and innovation. I also find that the effects of external finance on 
innovation depend on the institutional environment in which firms operate. In 
particular, the quality of political institutions appears to moderate the asymmetric 
information problem between firms and potential investors. Policy implications point 
to the importance of efficient financial markets and institutions that potentially reduce 
information asymmetries between investors and innovators.  
 In Chapter 2, I study the relation between innovation investments and capital 
structures of firms in China. By investigating how innovation affects the leverage ratio 
of firms as well as the relation between profitability and capital structure, I find that 
innovation investment in China is significantly positively related to future leverage 
ratios for state-owned firms, while the impact on the capital structures of private firms 
is not the same. The increase of leverage ratios is less than that of state-owned firms 
and can even go negative. The striking difference can be explained by the Chinese 
state-dominated financial system inherited from the socialist centrally-planned 
economy. Even though the Chinese authority started to reform the system in the 
middle of 1990s to improve the efficiency of banks in allocating capital and allowing 
private firms’ access to bank financing, state-owned firms are still less credit 
constrained because of their small default risk supported by the government bailout 
policies. To promote innovation of a country, in addition to a series of government 
technology innovation policies, one of the most important steps is to relax the credit 
constraint problems faced by many private firms, a key indicator of the success of the 
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ongoing financial system reforms in China. 
 Both of the chapters imply the importance of equity financing on innovation 
investment in developing countries especially for those young, small and private firms 
such as in China. The finding points to the significance of the private equity market for 
financing of innovation in the emerging economy context.  
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CHAPTER 1 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION IN  
ASIAN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
1.1  Introduction 
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), in an efficient market with perfect 
information and no transaction costs, firms choose optimal levels of investments to 
maximize their returns, which do not depend on how the firms are financed. At the 
margin, firms should face the same cost of capital for all types of investment. However, 
in reality, this theorem is often violated because of a variety of financial market 
distortions. Recent studies have provided evidence of an impact of financial 
constraints on fixed investment (Bond and Meghir 1994, Love 2003). Hall (2005) 
surveyed the evidence on the “funding gap” for innovation investment and 
summarized that the reasons for why the Modigliani-Miller theorem might fail to hold 
in practice could be attributed to factors such as taxes, transaction costs, and agency 
problems (see also Stein 2003).  
In the case of investments in innovation—creation of new products and 
technologies—financing constraints may be even more severe because of the 
substantial uncertainty regarding the final output of this expensive and risky process 
(Lerner, Shane, and Zhao 2002; Savignac 2006). Schumpeter (1939), widely regarded 
as the pioneer in the economic analysis of innovation, made the study of resource 
allocation, especially the allocation of financial resources, central to his work on 
innovation (see also O’Sullivan 2006). Since then, economists have long held the view 
that innovative activities are difficult to finance in a competitive marketplace 
(Schumpeter 1942, Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Hall 2005).  
In the emerging-market context, where the financial market is less developed than 
  5 
in industrialized countries, access to external sources of finance for innovation is 
likely to even more significantly influence firms’ ability to engage in risky new 
product or process development projects. Economists have argued that innovation is 
essential for firm survival, economic growth and development (Schumpeter 1942, 
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2006). Financing of innovation is thus an 
important managerial and policy challenge. Indeed, a large body of research argues 
that financial development is a significant driver of economic growth and development 
(see Levine, 1997, for a survey). Nevertheless, there is little research that would 
highlight the mechanisms through which financial development influences economic 
development. We argue that innovation is one such channel and examine the role of 
external finance in funding firms’ innovation investments. 
Most studies of financing of R&D focus on the link between internal 
finance—usually measures of cash flow—and R&D investment (e.g., Hall, 1992; 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) to identify financing constraints for investment with 
uncertain output and asymmetric information. In contrast, we control for internal 
finance and focus on the relationship between external sources of finance and 
innovation activities. Whereas about eighty percent of all financing for investments, 
including fixed investments and industrial R&D, is done with internally generated 
funds (Ross et al. 1993), we argue that external financial resources are also critical for 
some of the most innovative firms. Even though firms facing profitable innovation 
opportunities would prefer to use internal funds, firms such as technology-based 
startups usually have little cash flow and therefore they may be dependent on external 
finance for innovation. However, innovating firms may be even more financially 
constrained in emerging economies because financial markets are less mature than in 
the industrialized world. As a consequence, without well-functioning financial markets, 
economies may experience substantially lower rates of technological change and 
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economic growth. Focusing on the actual external financing sources of firms, our 
results for Asian emerging economies particularly point to the importance of private 
equity and family finance for innovation. 
Young firms are likely to have more limited internal sources of finance—in some 
cases it may take years for high tech firms to even start generating sales revenue. The 
fundamental reasons for the external financial constraints of small and young 
innovators are related to the information asymmetries between firms and their 
potential investors. A firm’s managers will know more about their innovation 
investment opportunities than potential outside funders, and it is difficult to credibly 
exchange this information. The situation involves high transaction costs and can be 
characterized as a classical lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). 
In summary, compared with previous studies, our paper makes the following 
contributions:  
a. Using a cross-country and cross-industry dataset, our study compares the effects of 
different sources of external financing on innovation investment decision across a 
diverse set of industries and regions, with generalizable results for emerging 
economies. Much of the previous research on capital structure focuses on large, 
listed corporations in the developed world, whereas more than 90 percent of our 
sample consists of non-listed firms. Therefore, in contrast to the great majority of 
previous studies, our data are not limited to publicly traded firms, or the very 
special case of venture-capital financed privately-held firms. This study is based 
on a representative sample of companies in developing countries. 
b. We study which sources of external finance are the most essential in promoting 
innovation in these emerging economies, comparing and contrasting funding from 
local and foreign commercial banks, equity markets, governmental investment 
funds, and family and friends.  
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c. We also examine whether the macroeconomic factors of literacy and political 
institutions moderate the effects of external finance on innovation. Literacy level is 
one of the determinants of the overall human capital stock as well as economic 
development. It reflects the general innovation ability of a country and influences 
the demand for innovation and innovation financing, Political constraints not only 
capture the political risk of investment but also influence the supply of finance for 
a country. A country with lower political risk provides a better environment for 
domestic investors but also attracts more foreign investors.  
d. Our attention is focused on a set of emerging economies in Eastern Asia, in 
Southern Asia, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. To date, there is little research 
on any aspects of innovation in the emerging economy context. We include firms 
from nineteen countries, with eight countries from the low-income group, nine 
countries from the lower middle-income group and two countries from the upper 
middle-income group according to the World Bank categorization. 
Our results suggest that the effects of external finance on innovation investments are 
statistically significant and the most pronounced for small firms and for firms 
operating in economies with medium levels of political institutions. These effects are 
equally large for firms engaging in product innovation and process innovation. We 
interpret these results through the literature on the relationship between asymmetric 
information conditions and external financial constraints. Under conditions where the 
information asymmetry between potential investors and the firm’s managers is more 
substantial, innovating firms are more severely financially constrained. Then, firms 
with access to external finance will be more likely to innovate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the 
relevant literatures from three different perspectives. This theoretical discussion is 
used to formulate a set of empirical hypotheses. The third section introduces the 
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dataset as well as the empirical model and methods. In the fourth section, we conduct 
the empirical analyses. The last section discusses the results and provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
1.2  Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations 
1.2.1  Investment and Financial Constraints 
Previous research has examined the reasons why the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is 
unlikely to hold in practice. Among the most important factors are taxation that favors 
certain types of investments; transaction costs that vary between types of investments; 
and informational asymmetries and agency problems (Hall 2002 and 2005; Stein 
2003). In particular, firms may find it difficult to raise external funds for financing 
their investments due to informational asymmetries with external investors (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984); in the case of innovative investments, financing constraints may be 
even tighter because the output of innovative projects is highly uncertain.  
Innovative investments are thus particularly risky (Savignac 2006), inducing high 
transaction costs and financing difficulties (Williamson 1988). More specifically, it is 
difficult for a firm’s managers to credibly communicate the quality of the innovation 
investment opportunity because of adverse selection and moral hazard. Even when the 
firm is able to describe the innovation project, it might be reluctant to do so because of 
the concern for information spillovers. Moreover, R&D investment does not lead to 
the build-up of useful collateral, further increasing transaction hazards for potential 
investors. As a result, flows of financial resources for innovative projects will be 
rationed by suppliers of capital, even if the project is promising (Jaffee and Russell 
1976, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The separation of ownership and management thus 
drives a wedge between the costs of external and internal funds.  
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In short, from a theoretical perspective, when financial frictions exist, financing 
constraints are likely to arise, and the costs of internal and external financing will 
diverge. Firms facing high frictions are expected to be less able to engage in costly 
innovation investment projects. In terms of empirical testing, when financial 
constraints are tight, exogenous changes to the availability of external finance will 
significantly influence firms’ likelihood of engaging in innovation activities. 
1.2.2  Financial Development and Economic Growth 
Dating as far back as Schumpeter (1911), a large literature emphasizes the positive 
influence of the development of a country’s financial sector on the level and the rate of 
growth of its per capita income. Levine (2004) provides a comprehensive literature 
review regarding research on the thesis that financial development promotes long-term 
economic growth. By using cross-country aggregate data, King and Levine (1993) and 
Levine, Loaya, and Beck (2000) concluded that financial development promotes 
growth. 
Furthermore, economists have emphasized the role of financial development in 
better identifying investment opportunities, reducing investment in liquid but 
unproductive assets, mobilizing savings, boosting technological innovation, and 
improving risk taking (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Love (2003) provides further 
evidence that financial development impacts growth by reducing financing constraints 
that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment. In addition, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) found that industries requiring much external finance grow faster in 
more developed capital markets, suggesting that financial constraints negatively 
impact the growth of firms and industries.  
Additional institutional factors have been found to moderate the effects of 
financial markets on growth. For example, both the financial and legal systems of a 
country are positively related to the proportion of rapidly-growing firms 
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(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). Moreover, firm growth is more affected by 
self-reported financing constraints in countries with underdeveloped financial and 
legal systems and high corruption (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002). It is 
thus important to consider the macroeconomic and institutional environment when 
studying the relationship between financial development and firm performance. To 
summarize, the literature discussed above demonstrates that financial development has 
an important impact on economic growth. The starting point of our research is the 
assumption that firms’ innovation activities are an important mechanism that channels 
this impact.  
1.2.3  Empirical Studies 
Because the theoretical literature has emphasized that investment in innovative 
projects is very likely to be influenced by financial constraints, empirical evidence of 
the existence of these financial constraints has largely been focused on the relationship 
between cash flow and R&D investment. This ignores the possibility that, even with 
the transactional hazards involved with external finance of R&D, financially 
constrained but innovative firms may be willing to bear the additional costs of capital 
in order to exploit highly profitable innovation opportunities.  
There are various ways to study the existence as well as the effect of financial 
constraints on investment. In empirical literature, the existence of financial constraints 
for innovative firms is most frequently identified by examining the sensitivity of R&D 
investment to financial factors. One approach is based on the Q theory of investment 
suggested by Tobin (1969) that has been widely used in the financial literature after 
the influential paper of Fazzari et al. (1988). The second approach examines the 
sensitivity of investments to financial factors through estimating the Euler equation for 
the capital stock (Claessens and Tzioumis 2006). While a number of studies find 
significant cash-flow effect on R&D investments by firms (Himmelberg and Petersen 
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1994), which means that a large and significant relationship between R&D and 
internal finance exists, whether this cash-flow sensitivity of investment can be 
interpreted as revealing the existence of financial obstacles is still debatable (Kaplan 
and Zingales 1997, Alti 2003 and Gomes 2001). 
An alternative strand in the literature examines factors that affect firms’ 
propensity to innovate. By conventionally controlling for country and industry 
dummies, these empirical models usually include firm characteristics, such as firms’ 
size and the market power, or environmental factors linked to the market or to 
technological opportunities (Savignac 2006). However, few studies consider financial 
constraints when they explore the propensity to innovate (but see Crepon et al. 1998, 
Mohnen and Therrien 2002). Savignac (2006) also examines the impact of financial 
constraints on innovation for French firms and finds that financial constraints 
significantly reduce the probability that a firm undertakes innovative projects, whereas 
Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) implicitly identify financial constraints through the 
effects of government R&D support and suggest that government subsidies may 
alleviate the effects of capital market imperfections on innovation investments. 
In a study conceptually closest to ours, Brown, Fazzari and Peterson (2009) 
identify financial factors for young high-tech firms that explain a significant portion of 
the dramatic 1990s boom, and the subsequent decline, in R&D investments in the 
United States. They argue that if young high-tech firms face binding financing 
constraints, then exogenous changes in the supply of either internal or external equity 
finance should lead to changes in R&D. Furthermore, if such firms undertake a large 
fraction of aggregate R&D, then changes in the availability of finance may have 
macroeconomic significance. By analyzing microeconomic data of the US firms, they 
highlight a key mechanism that connects finance and growth: firms’ innovation 
investments. 
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The literature on financial constraints that employs econometric modeling of 
publicly-traded firms’ financial statements provides a rigorous method for empirical 
investigation. However, it is of little use in the context of emerging economies since 
the majority of private sector activity originates from SMEs for which financial data is 
limited. In addition, in transition and developing economies, financial statements are 
not as reliable as those in developed countries (Claessens and Tzioumis 2006). 
Therefore, our goal is to develop an alternative empirical approach that circumvents 
these data problems related to analyzing financing of innovation in emerging economy 
settings.  
1.2.4  Empirical Hypotheses 
Building on the literature described above, we acknowledge the importance of (and we 
empirically control for) internal financing of innovation for firms, but we also argue 
that external finance is critical for a substantial range of innovative firms. In particular, 
small, young, and privately-held firms are more likely to be financially constrained, 
because they may have limited internal funds, but at the same time, they may 
experience a particularly high cost of external capital due to asymmetric information. 
Similarly, product innovating firms are likely to be more affected by information 
asymmetries with outside investors than are firms engaged in process innovation or 
technology adoption. We therefore expect to find a stronger relationship between 
external finance and innovation activities for these firms, as articulated in the first 
hypothesis:  
H1 Innovating firms that are financially constrained and facing conditions of 
more substantial asymmetric information are likely to more strongly respond 
to exogenous variation in access to external finance. 
We also examine the contribution to innovation of different sources of external finance. 
Although the extant literature on the financing of R&D has largely focused on 
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sensitivity of R&D investments on internal financing (although see MacKie-Mason, 
1989), we suggest that different sources of external finance have different implications 
for innovation. In our dataset we can distinguish external sources such as banks, equity, 
family and friends, and investment funds. Most previous studies have analyzed 
publicly-traded firms, for which equity financing is available through public equity 
markets. In our dataset, in contrast, only 6% of firms are listed in a stock exchange. 
This means that we can assess the innovation impact of funding from the private 
equity market.1 Much recent research has examined innovation by and funding of 
venture-capital financed firms (e.g., Lerner, 1994; Lerner, Shane and Tsai, 2003). We 
argue that this is a relatively small and quite special subset of privately-held firms. Our 
analyses highlight the impact of all types of private equity funding on innovation. 
The early “pecking order theory” by Myers and Majlof (1984) suggested that, 
because of the various transaction costs associated with different types of external 
finance, firms will first try to finance investments internally, then issue debt, and only 
as a last resort, raise new equity. Although this approximation may apply to mature 
firms in traditional industries, Hall (2002) concludes that, compared to non-R&D 
intensive firms, the capital structure of R&D intensive firms tends to exhibit 
significantly less leverage, i.e., be less oriented to debt as a source of external finance. 
For R&D intensive firms the advantages of equity over debt financing include that 
there are no collateral requirements and that the risk of financial distress and 
ultimately bankruptcy is not increased by the funding (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 
2009: 157). We thus expect that external funds obtained from equity markets for 
innovation—public or private—will be more relevant for financing innovation than 
funds obtained from commercial credit markets. 
                                                        
1
 Note that we are simply referring to private transactions with equity, as opposed to using a stock 
exchange to trade shares publicly, rather than the specific notion of “private equity.” 
  14 
H2 Equity financing is more conducive than debt financing to innovation 
activities. 
Because of the bias in empirical research on the financing of innovation investments 
toward publicly-traded firms, an important type of external finance has been entirely 
ignored in the scholarly literature to date. Much very early-stage venturing is financed 
through the private sources of family and friends (and possibly “fools,” to complete 
the “FFF” framework). This is consistent with the implications of asymmetric 
information, because these types of individuals are likely to have a trusting 
relationship with the entrepreneur, thereby greatly mitigating the lemons problem. 
Financing from family and friends could be either in the form of debt or equity, and 
we cannot distinguish between the two. Although the practitioner-oriented literature 
frequently discusses this type of financing, research explicitly focused on 
entrepreneurial finance has barely begun to analyze this type of funding (see e.g., 
Cowling et al. 2009). We hypothesize that the availability of family financing is most 
likely to be driving innovation of the smallest and youngest firms. These firms are the 
most constrained and facing the highest degrees if asymmetric information, but their 
financing need is also likely to be more modest than their larger counterparts so that 
individuals may have sufficient funds to make a difference. 
H3 Financial resources from family and friends are the most likely to drive 
innovation by small and young firms. 
Finally, our dataset of firms in emerging economies allows us to examine how the 
macroeconomic environment moderates the hypothesized effects of external finance 
on firms’ innovation activities. We focus on the effects of two factors that influence 
the conditions of asymmetric information and investment risk faced by firms: literacy 
and political constraints. Literacy is an indicator of the general level of human capital 
in the country, and as such, it is correlated with the difficulty of communicating 
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technological innovation projects to potential investors. Political constraints measure 
the degree to which the institutional environment of a country contains checks and 
balances for political decision makers. This indicator is related with the number of 
political players with veto power. The more political players with veto power, i.e. the 
more political constraints for the political leader, the more difficult for them to 
implement their preferences without consensus and coordination with other players. 
Checks and balances influence political and financial risks (Henisz 2005). Political 
constraints are thus a general measure of political risk and correlated with 
transactional hazards that influence investment decisions. When political institutions 
are poor, external finance is likely to be particularly costly for innovating firms. We 
expect both of these macroeconomic factors to moderate the impact of external 
finance on innovation. In particular, we expect family financing to be the most useful 
in less developed macroeconomic environments, where political institutions and 
human capital are the least developed, and asymmetric information and other 
transaction costs are especially high.  
H4 The macroeconomic environment measured by levels of human capital and 
political risk accentuates the effects of asymmetric information and other 
transactional frictions on innovation investments. 
 
1.3  Econometric Analysis 
1.3.1  The Dataset 
Our analysis is based on the micro data from the Enterprise Survey conducted by the 
World Bank. “The purpose of this survey is to better understand conditions in the local 
investment climate and how they affect firm-level productivity.”(World Bank’s 
Enterprise Survey 2007). The first part of the survey deals with the characteristics of 
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firms’ business and the investment climate. In addition to general information about 
firms, this part contains a series of questions on firms’ infrastructure and services, 
sales and supplies, degrees of competition, crime, land, business-government relations 
and investment climate constraints. The second part of the survey contains questions 
on production costs, investment flows, balance sheet information, and workforce 
statistics.  
The surveys used here were conducted between 2003 and 2005, and the samples 
were designed to be representative of the populations of firms according in each 
industry and each country. Our dataset includes Asian developing countries and some 
East European and Central Asian transition countries, where innovation activities have 
not been studied as much as in the industrialized world. Due to the availability of our 
key innovation variables and information about the details of external financing 
sources, we utilize data from nineteen countries, of which five are in East Asia and 
twelve are in Central Asia and East Europe. The full sample consists of nearly 12,000 
firms and covers key manufacturing and service sectors including agriculture, food, 
leather, textiles, electronics, and telecommunications. Because of item non-response, 
our estimation sample consists of 6940 firms with full answers to the questions used to 
construct our empirical variables.  
Table 1.1 summarizes the observations and the key variables in each of the 19 
countries and 25 industries. The numbers of firms in the country samples vary 
considerably with the size of the economy. We can see that China and India, two of the 
largest emerging economies, constitute around 40% of the sample. About 37% is from 
East Asian and Pacific countries, 43% from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (former 
Soviet republics), and 20% from South Asia. 
In light of our research questions, the information available in the survey has 
several advantages over alternatives for analyzing the relationship between financing 
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Table 1. 1  Innovation, external finance, and observations  
by country and by industry 
 
Panel A 
 
Country Innovation Share of external finance Observations 
Armenia 0.772 29.919 307 
Azerbaijan 0.816 2.336 304 
Belarus 0.858 17.592 211 
Cambodia 0.975 73.511 487 
China 0.537 38.674 1333 
Georgia 0.699 25.959 73 
India 0.711 39.711 1365 
Indonesia 0.759 35.412 291 
Kazakhstan 0.721 17.786 308 
Kyrgyzstan 0.813 12.086 139 
Moldova 0.816 19.644 239 
Mongolia 0.774 38.459 146 
Philippines 0.833 28.029 174 
Russia 0.701 7.854 431 
Tajikistan 0.814 5.294 102 
Turkey 0.579 40.145 330 
Ukraine 0.814 22.600 430 
Uzbekistan 0.614 4.658 114 
Vietnam 0.910 62.126 156 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
 Panel B 
 
Industry Innovation Share of external finance Observations 
Accounting and finance 0.269 33.194 67 
Advertising and marketing 0.509 24.843 159 
Agroindustry 0.921 66.629 89 
Auto and auto components 0.730 39.183 371 
Beverages 0.850 25.267 446 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 0.709 43.098 302 
Construction 0.774 21.059 376 
Electronics 0.747 34.458 491 
Food 0.746 37.942 398 
Garments 0.677 35.908 728 
Hotels and restaurants 0.766 32.189 201 
IT services 0.711 38.497 187 
Leather 0.866 34.478 67 
Metals and machinery 0.751 30.327 676 
Mining and quarrying 0.741 27.586 58 
Non-metallic and plastic materials 0.676 39.444 216 
Other manufacturing 0.887 33.943 53 
Other services 0.660 38.288 462 
Other transport equipment 0.889 17.222 9 
Paper 0.716 26.800 95 
Real estate and rental services 0.586 17.471 87 
Retail and wholesale trade 0.650 23.256 738 
Telecommunications 0.938 11.563 32 
Textiles 0.824 44.508 313 
Transport 0.798 24.438 178 
Wood and furniture 0.723 26.217 141 
Total 0.724 32.684 6940 
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and technological innovations in emerging economies. First, it is based on a 
standardized questionnaire and a uniform sampling methodology across a large set of 
countries. As a result, it yields comparable information of firm-level variables and 
facilitates industry and country comparisons. Second, the survey allows us to analyze 
both product and process innovation activities (Ayyagari Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 2006, Almeida and Fernandes 2006). Third, the survey collects detailed 
information about the major channels used by firms to acquire financing for their 
investments and working capital, which makes the study on the relation between 
external finance and innovation possible. Finally, the survey contains information 
about many other relevant firm characteristics which need to be accounted for when 
assessing the relationship between external finance and innovation. These variables 
include new technology adoption, ownership structure, in-house training, firm age, 
size, and participation in international trade. 
 
1.3.2  Empirical Analysis 
 
1.3.2.1  Basic Model 
The goal of the following empirical analysis is to identify the relationship between 
firms’ access to external finance and innovation, controlling for relevant firm-, 
industry-, and country-level factors that also influence firms’ decisions to engage in 
innovation. 
The data do not provide a specific variable for innovation investment activity. 
Therefore, our measure of innovation investment activity derives from six 
innovation-related responses from the survey. Following Ayyagari Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2006), we use a broad definition of innovation activities. In addition to 
the core innovation activity of developing new products and processes, a set of 
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organizational innovations are included. As long as the firm indicated that it engages 
in any of the following activities, we will define it has innovation investment activity: 
1) Developed a major new product line, 2) Upgraded an existing product line, 3) 
Introduced new technology that has substantially changed the way that the main 
product is produced, 4) Opened a new plant, 5) Obtained a new licensing agreement, 6) 
Brought in-house a major production activity that was previously outsourced. The 
resulting variable is thus a binary indicator for innovative investment decision with the 
value 0 and 1. For one set of analyses comparing product and process innovation, we 
define product innovation as a positive answer to the first type of innovation activity 
which is specific to new product innovation, and process innovation as a positive 
answer to the third element, which is about improving the current production process. 
Firm-level control variables include firm size, age, export activity, government 
ownership, foreign ownership, and in-house training for employees. The survey 
categorized the size of firms into three groups: small firms are defined as those with 
fewer than 20 employees, medium-sized firms have 20 to 99 employees, and large 
firms have more than 99 employees. In our estimation sample, small firms amount to 
36.95%, medium-sized firms make up 33.11%, and large firms constitute 29.94% of 
the sample. The expected benefit from innovation depends on the size of the firm 
because of economies of scale in R&D. As a firm gets larger, it can amortize the sunk 
costs of innovation investments over a larger volume of sales. Firm age ranges from 0 
to 149 years. More than half of the firms in our sample were less than 10 years old 
when the surveys were conducted and about 80% firms in our sample were less than 
20 years old. As size and age are likely to be correlated with information costs, they 
are taken as proxies for firms’ financial constraints (Hubbard 1998).  
Foreign ownership refers to the nationality of the primary shareholders. In an 
earlier study by Almeida and Fernandes (2006), majority foreign-owned firms were 
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found to be significantly less likely to engage in technological innovations than 
minority foreign-owned firms or domestic firms. Moreover, these authors found that 
joint ventures between foreign- and domestic-owned firms are more fruitful than 
fully-owned foreign subsidiaries because they are associated with a greater degree of 
technology transfer. However, evidence is inconclusive regarding whether technology 
transfers from parent firms to fully-owned subsidiaries are higher than those to 
minority-owned subsidiaries. Nevertheless, extant research suggests that foreign 
ownership may influence the incentives for innovation, and, hence, it is an important 
firm characteristic to control. In our sample, about 14% of the firms have foreign 
ownership.  
We also control for the share of government ownership. Government ownership 
percentage ranges from 0 to 100 and the average is 9.45%. Government ownership is a 
relevant control variable because government ownership might be associated with 
different types of incentives for innovation and improvement than private-sector 
ownership. 
Export activity is another firm-level control variable. If the exposure to export 
markets is indeed a channel promoting innovations, firms facing strong competition in 
export markets will be forced to more frequently improve their technological 
capabilities than firms exclusively oriented to the domestic market. In our sample, 
around 17% of firms engaged in export activities. 
We also control firms’ internal training that is important for developing the human 
resource base essential for innovation. In the survey, firms were asked whether they 
offered formal training (beyond “on the job”) to the permanent employees. Within the 
whole sample, 42.5% of firms provided such formal training.  
In addition to firm-level variables and industry dummies, we consider two 
important country-level control variables: literacy level and political constraints, 
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which affect the country-level innovation environment as well as the demand for and 
supply of innovation financing. The literacy information comes from the United 
Nations Human Development Report. It calculates the adult literacy rate (percentage 
of literate adults, 15 years and older) one year before the Enterprise Survey was 
collected. We expect a higher literacy rate to be more conducive to innovation by firms, 
thus more demand for innovative finance in countries with higher literacy rates. We 
use it as a measure of development instead of GDP per capita, because it not only 
captures economic development of the country but also the general human resource 
base. The two variables are highly correlated. 
The country-level political environment index, POLCONIII, is constructed by W. 
Henisz (see Henisz and Zelner 2006). Previous studies have usually used 
macroeconomic accounting measures (Frankel and Rose 1996) to reflect financial 
market stability. However, Frankel and Rose argued that these conventional risk 
measures are problematic because of their lack of focus on political systems. The latter 
would better capture why less investment occurs in countries that managers perceive 
to be risky and reflect the fundamental sources of risk. We assume that stable political 
environments are more conducive to risky and difficult-to-appropriate investments in 
innovation. Moreover, the supply and terms of external finance will also be affected by 
the stability of the political environment. Structurally derived from a spatial model of 
political interaction, the measure of political constraints incorporates data on the 
number of independent political institutions with veto power in a given polity and data 
on the alignment and heterogeneity of the political actors that inhabit those institutions 
(Henisz 2005). 
Finally, we include the industry average for the share of internal finance for 
working capital. This is intended to control for the impact of cash flow on innovation 
investment, assuming that a substantial part of cash flow is correlated among firms in 
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an industry. We cannot include firm-level internal finance variable because of its 
collinearity with the share of external finance (shares of internal and external finance 
sum up to 100% in our dataset). 
Our main explanatory variables of interest represent firm-level external finance. 
In the survey, firms were asked to identify the contributions over the last year of each 
of the following sources of financing for new investments: internal funds, local 
commercial banks, foreign commercial banks, leasing arrangements, investment 
funds/special development financing, trade credit, credit cards, equity, family, and 
informal sources (e.g. money). As financing for innovation is not directly surveyed, 
we will use the contribution of each external financial resource for new investment as 
a proxy for the available financing for innovation activity. In other words, we will 
assume that the funding for innovation investment is positively correlated with that for 
other types of new investments.  
Table 1.2 summarizes the contribution of each source of financial resources for 
new investment. Internal funds are the most important financial resource. In addition, 
the use of the financial resources agrees with the “pecking order theory” in terms of 
the overall ranking of debt vs. equity finance: The top three external sources of finance 
are local commercial banks, the equity market, and family or friends, although if most 
of family funding is in the form of equity, then the two forms of equity finance 
together are greater than debt finance. It should be noted that a rather small minority 
of firms in the sample are publicly traded (6.3% of the estimation sample). The 
relevant equity market for most of the firms studied here is thus the private one.  
From the different sources of external finance we also construct a summary 
variable of external finance by adding up the contribution percentage for new 
investment from local commercial banks, foreign commercial banks, equity markets, 
and family and friends, deemed to be the most important sources of external funds. We  
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Table 1. 2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Continuous variables Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Financial variables     
Share of internal finance 51.066  42.481  0 100 
Share of external finance 32.684  40.783  0 100 
Share of local bank finance 16.477  30.901  0 100 
Share of foreign bank finance 0.815  7.336  0 100 
Share of equity finance 8.704  25.767  0 100 
Share of finance from family and friends 6.688  21.299  0 100 
Share of finance from investment funds 0.784  6.676  0 100 
Share of informal finance 1.320  9.458  0 100 
Firm-level control variables         
Government ownership 9.454  28.136  0 100 
Firm age 14.721  14.337  1 149 
Country-level control variables         
Political constraints 0.227  0.187  0 0.537 
Literacy 87.012  14.510  73.6 100 
Binary variables (0,1) Mean       
Any innovation 0.724     
Product innovation 0.652     
Process innovation 0.376     
Organizational innovation 0.207     
Product or process innovation 0.704     
Publicly traded firm 0.063     
Small firm (1-19 employees) 0.369     
Medium-sized firm (20-99 employees) 0.331     
Large firm (over 99 employees) 0.299     
Age less than 10 years 0.558     
Primarily foreign ownership 0.116     
Any exports 0.169     
In-house training 0.425        
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use this summary variable to analyze the general effect of the availability of external 
finance on innovation.  
 
1.3.2.2  Empirical Model 
Let ijcI  be an index variable that equals to one if a firm i  in industry j  and 
country c  engages in innovation activity, zero otherwise. The probability that the 
firm innovates is empirically modeled using a probit model. The empirical framework 
considers a risk-neutral firm deciding whether to engage in innovation investment to 
maximize its profit.  
Let *ijcY  be the expected profit from the innovation project of a firm i  in 
industry j  in country c . If the profit was greater than zero, the firm would invest in 
the innovation project. We assume that *ijcY  is a function of firm characteristics such 
as age, size, ownership status, export activities, and in-house training. Furthermore, 
our control variables for the country-level macroeconomic conditions include adult 
literacy and political constraints.  
The main model assumes that  
 
* Industry dummies+ijc ijc ijc c ijcY EXTFIN X Zα β γ δ ε= + + +      (3.1) 
where ijcX  is a vector of firm characteristics and cZ represents country-level 
characteristics. We also use industry dummies to control for industry effects. Since 
*
ijcY  is not observable, the equation above cannot be estimated directly.  
 
Instead, we assume that           
*1, if 0
0, otherwise
ijc
ijc
Y
I
 >
=

     (3.2) 
 
Then, 
Pr( 1) Pr( Industry dummies)ijc ijc ijc ijc cI EXTFIN X Zε α β γ δ= = > − − − −      (3.3) 
Assuming that ijcε are normally distributed, we can estimate equation (3.3) by probit 
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maximum likelihood.  
 To identify the causal effect of external finance on innovation activities, we need 
to consider unobserved heterogeneity. Both innovation and external finance could be 
affected by unobservable factors, which would bias the coefficient of external finance 
in the probit model. On one hand, from the demand side, firms with innovation 
activities may be more motivated to seek external finance for their investment projects. 
This would make the coefficient of external finance positively biased. On the other 
hand, from the supply side, external investors might be reluctant to finance an 
innovative firm because it is more risky, which could make the coefficient negatively 
biased. In practice, the potential bias of the coefficient of external finance depends on 
whether supply factors or demand factors are dominating. Our approach is to use 
instrumental variable methods to identify exogenous variation in the external finance 
variables. Provided that our instrumental variables are valid, we can then estimate the 
two-step IV probit version of the basic model.  
Our instruments include the firm-level observations of external auditing, 
country-industry level averages, excluding the focal firm, of the shares of external 
finance, and the concentration of commercial banks in each country. External auditing 
variable, which is an indicator about whether an establishment has its annual financial 
statement reviewed by an external auditor or not, provides information to external 
investors and affects the costs and benefits of providing finance. All forms of external 
finance are influenced by this factor because the information revealed by annual 
auditing affects all types of external investors. In addition, we utilize country-industry 
level averages, excluding the focal firm, of the shares of external finance, which 
represents exogenous variation in the industrial environment in terms of general 
availability of external finance. We also utilize the exogenous effect of the financial 
market structure on external finance. A highly concentrated commercial banking sector 
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is likely to reduce the competitive pressure to attract savings and channel them 
efficiently to investors (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1999).  
1.4  Results   
Table 1.3 reports the first set of results from estimating different versions of Equation 
(3.3). The coefficient of External finance is always positive and statistically significant, 
which implies that the access to a higher level of external finance for new investment 
is associated with a greater probability of innovation. The marginal effect of External 
finance is 0.00069 for the probit model. In other words, one percent increase in 
external financing is associated with an increase in the probability of innovation of 
about 0.1 percent. The effect is thus economically small but statistically very 
significant. The marginal effects of External finance are 0.002, 0.001 for the probit 
models above, respectively. In other words, one percent increase in external financing 
is associated with an increase in the probability of innovation investment of about 0.1 
percent.  The marginal effect of external finance for the IV probit model is 0.009 
(third specification in Table 1.3) suggests that the probability are increased by 4% 
when an additional percentage point of external finance (measured as the percentage 
share of total finance) is obtained. Compared to the odds ratios for the coefficients 
from the probit models, the instrumental variable model suggests a larger impact and 
hence that the simple probit model provides estimates that are biased downwards. 
Finally, the Wald test for exogeneity (not reported) suggests external finance is indeed 
endogenous. 
   In terms of the control variables, we find in all models that younger and larger 
firms and those providing in-house training are significantly more innovative. We also 
find a better political environment and higher literacy level positively promotes firms’ 
innovation propensities. Firms engaging in export activity are also more innovative,  
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Table 1. 3 The effect of external finance on innovation (N=6940) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for each column is any innovation. The external finance variable is 
instrumented in the third specification. Instruments include the firm-level survey question regarding 
auditing, country-industry-level averages of external finance excluding the focal firm, and country-level 
concentration of the financial market. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; 
** and * indicate confidence levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
 Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Constant -0.099  0.619 1.235 * 0.634 -2.052 ** 0.832 
External finance 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001 0.040 *** 0.004 
Internal finance (industry) 0.007 *** 0.001 -0.003  0.003 0.027 *** 0.003 
Gov. ownership -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 
Age -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.014 -0.003 * 0.002 
Medium-sized 0.098 ** 0.042 0.198 *** 0.044 0.145 ** 0.061 
Large 0.313 *** 0.053 0.445 *** 0.056 0.232 *** 0.077 
Foreign ownership 0.062  0.060 -0.032  0.063 0.341 *** 0.061 
Exports 0.383 *** 0.055 0.321 *** 0.057 0.243 *** 0.077 
Training 0.333 *** 0.043 0.483 *** 0.048 0.341 *** 0.061 
Political constraints 1.266 *** 0.129    0.605 *** 0.196 
Literacy 0.005 ** 0.002    0.011 *** 0.003 
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   
Country dummies No   Yes   No   
Estimation method Probit   Probit   IV probit   
Log likelihood -3756.92   -3487.86      
Pseudo R2 0.0808   0.1466      
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test for 
overidentification  
 
    
2.055 
 
 (p-value 
0.3579) 
 
. 
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which is in accord with previous literature. Among the effects that somewhat vary 
between the models, industry-level internal finance has a significantly positive effect 
on innovation in two of the three models, whereas the effect of governmental 
ownership is not consistent across models.  
Next, we examine whether the effect of external finance depends on firms’ other 
characteristics, such as size and age. We generate interaction terms with external 
finance by utilizing the dummy for firms with fewer than 20 employees and the 
dummy for firms younger than 10 years. The results are shown in Table 1.4. The 
interaction effect of small size and external finance is positive significant but the 
moderating effect of age on the relation between external finance and innovation is not 
significant. For robustness check, we also classify the firms according to their ages 
into different groups, including ages less than five years old and ages less than ten 
years old. The results are similar the interaction analysis and we did not find that age 
would influence the effect of external financing on innovation investment outcomes 
among these firms. 
Because of the issues from estimating interaction effects in probit models, we also 
report the graphical “interaction effect” analysis (see Ai and Norton 2003; Norton et al. 
2004). The size effect on the relation between external finance and innovation is 
shown in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 (a) reports the estimated moderating effect of firm size from the probit 
model. The interaction effect is a function of the estimated probability of innovation. 
Figure 1.1(b) reports the significance levels for each observation. The moderating 
effect of size is positive for all observations. When a firm is in the smallest size group, 
the effect of external finance on probability of innovation is higher compared with 
medium-sized or large firms. The significance of the moderating effect exceeds 
conventional levels of confidence as the propensity of innovation approaches one. This
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Figure 1. 1 The moderating effect of firm size 
Figure 1.1 (a) reports the estimated moderating effect of firm size from the probit model, which is a 
function of the estimated probability of innovation. Figure 1.1 (b) reports the significance levels for 
each observation. The moderating effect of size is overall positive for all observations. 
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Table 1. 4 The moderating effects of firm size and age (N=6940) 
Notes: The dependent variable is any innovation. External finance variable and its interaction terms are instrumented in specifications 2 and 4. Instruments 
include the firm-level survey question regarding auditing, country-industry averages of external finance excluding the focal firm and country-level average 
of the concentration of the financial market. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; ** and * indicate confidence levels of 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
 Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Constant -0.156  0.621 -1.932 ** 0.860 -0.260  0.623 -1.173  7.941 
External finance 0.002 *** 0.001 0.038 *** 0.010 0.002 ** 0.001 0.187  0.279 
External finance*small firm 0.001 * 0.001 0.003  0.018       
External finance*age<10       0.001  0.001 -0.194  0.365 
Internal finance (industry) 0.006 *** 0.001 0.026 *** 0.003 0.006 *** 0.001 0.039  0.023 
Gov. ownership -0.001  0.001 0.002 * 0.001 -0.002 ** 0.001 0.012  0.016 
Age<10 0.103 ** 0.036 0.061  0.052 0.115 ** 0.045 6.324  11.77 
Small -0.203 *** 0.047 -0.266  0.567       
Medium-sized            0.098 ** 0.042 -0.207  0.195 
Large            0.313 *** 0.052 0.082  0.342 
Foreign ownership 0.093  0.060 0.322 *** 0.097 0.066  0.060 0.868  1.047 
Exports 0.434 *** 0.054 0.272 *** 0.082 0.392 *** 0.055 0.044  0.431 
Training 0.353 *** 0.043 0.351 *** 0.060 0.331 *** 0.043 0.391 ** 0.179 
Political constraints 1.215   0.1 0.566 ** 0.233 1.241 *** 0.129 1.531  1.832 
Literacy 0.005      0.012 *** 0.003 0.004 ** 0.002 0.021  0.019 
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Country dummies No   No   No   No   
Estimation method Probit   IV probit   Probit   IV   
Log likelihood -3770.918      -3762.0      
Pseudo R2 0.077      0.08      
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test 
for overidentification  
 
 
2.317 
  
(p-value 
0.128) 
   0.011 
 
 (p-value 
0.918) 
  32 
is in accordance with our first hypothesis. Small firms are facing conditions of more 
difficult information asymmetries than are medium-sized or large firms. Therefore, 
they are more financially constrained and hence likely to strongly respond to 
exogenous variation in access to external finance. 
In contrast, the interaction term of young firms and external finance is not 
significant. As shown in Figure 1.2, we can see that the moderating effect of age is 
generally positive except when the innovation probability is close to one.  
 We also distinguish between product and process innovations in the dependent 
variable and consider differences in the impact of external finance and the results are 
showed in Table 1.5.We use product innovation (specific to developing a new product 
line) and process innovation, including introducing new technology to production and 
upgrading an existing product line, as dependent variables and analyze how external 
finance influence each of them. We find that external finance has a significant positive 
effect in both probit and IV probit models for both types of innovation, but the results 
do not suggest the effect of external finance is clearly stronger for one type of 
innovation or the other. The marginal effects of external finance are almost identical in 
the two probit models (0.000767 for process innovation and 0.000736 for product 
innovation).  
Given the evidence that external financing is important for the probability of 
innovation investment, are there any differences in the impact of different sources of 
external finance on innovation investment decisions? This is particularly interesting 
from a policy perspective when governments aim to foster firms’ innovation 
investments. The results in Table 1.6 indicate that equity finance and family finance 
have significantly positive effects for financially constrained innovators in emerging 
economies, although the effect of family finance becomes statistically insignificant in 
the instrumental variable model. 
  
33
Table 1. 5 The effect of external finance on new product innovation and process innovation (N=6940) 
Notes: Dependent variable: New Product Innovation in (1) and (2). Process and upgrading existing product line Innovation in (3) and (4). The external 
finance variable is instrumented in the second and third specifications. Instruments include the firm-level survey question regarding auditing, 
country-industry averages of external finance excluding the focal firm and country-level concentration of the financial market. *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% confidence level; ** and * indicate confidence levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
  Coeff.   S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Constant -0.627  0.463 -1.654 *** 0.560  -2.150 *** 0.470  -4.170 *** 0.730  
External Finance 0.002 *** 0.000 0.022 *** 0.003  0.002 *** 0.000  0.040 *** 0.004  
Internal Finance(industry) 0.006 *** 0.001 0.017 *** 0.002  0.0001  0.001  0.021 *** 0.002  
Political constraints 0.910 *** 0.115  0.553 *** 0.144  0.525 *** 0.115  -0.140  0.187  
Literacy 0.000  0.002 0.003  0.002  0.017 *** 0.002  0.024 *** 0.003  
Gov.ownership 0.000  0.001 0.002 * 0.001  -0.0003  0.001  0.003 *** 0.001  
Age -0.004 *** 0.001 -0.002  0.001  -0.004 *** 0.001  -0.001  0.002  
Medium-sized 0.108 *** 0.039 0.133 *** 0.046  0.058  0.041  0.117 ** 0.061  
Large 0.286 *** 0.048 0.237 *** 0.056  0.273 *** 0.049  0.191 *** 0.074  
Foreign ownership -0.012  0.052 0.113 * 0.064  0.085  0.052  0.324 *** 0.083  
Exports 0.249 *** 0.046 0.166 *** 0.055  0.224 *** 0.046  0.074  0.072  
Training 0.211 *** 0.038 0.210 *** 0.044  0.283 *** 0.038  0.292 *** 0.058  
Estimated Method Probit    IV probit    Probit    IV probit    
Log Likelihood -4494.95      -4298.91      
Pseudo R squre 0.0458      0.0641      
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test for    2.851  (p-value    36.684  (p-value 
Over identification       0.2404)       0) 
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Table 1. 6 The effects of each source of external finance (N=6940) 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Any innovation. External finance variables and their interactions are 
instrumented in all but the first specification. Instruments include the firm-level survey question 
regarding auditing, country-industry averages of each form of external finance excluding the focal 
firm, and country-level concentration of the financial market. *** indicates statistical significance at 
the 1% confidence level; ** and * indicate confidence levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
 Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Constant -0.123  0.622 -0.529  1.743 -7.786  4.846 -0.444  0.831 
Local bank finance 0.000  0.001 0.009  0.015       
Foreign bank finance 0.004  0.003 0.350 * 0.182       
Equity finance 0.006 *** 0.001 0.035 *** 0.007    -0.016  0.030 
Family finance 0.002 *** 0.001 0.009  0.039 -0.329  0.235    
Family finance*small firm       0.725 ** 0.397    
Equity finance*small firm          0.088  0.058 
Internal finance (industry) 0.008 *** 0.001 0.019 *** 0.006 0.002  0.015 0.016  0.002 
Gov. ownership -0.001 ** 0.001 0.003 ** 0.002 -0.009  0.008 -0.001  0.001 
Age<10 0.108 *** 0.037 0.041  0.080 -0.206  0.255 0.116 * 0.067 
Medium-sized 0.116 *** 0.042 0.164  0.109 5.874 ** 3.047 0.878 ** 0.465 
Large 0.343 *** 0.053 0.029  0.313 4.988 ** 2.325 1.122 ** 0.483 
Foreign ownership 0.043  0.060 -0.372  0.422 0.108  0.344 0.073  0.091 
Exports 0.387 *** 0.055 0.093  0.193 0.122  0.373 0.290 *** 0.072 
Training 0.345 *** 0.044 0.257  0.166 -0.351  0.614 0.460 *** 0.077 
Political constraints 1.157 *** 0.130 -0.215  0.485 0.902  0.802 0.430 * 0.256 
Literacy 0.003  0.002 -0.003  0.007 0.055  0.034 -0.002  0.003 
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Country dummies No   No   No   No   
Estimation method Probit 
 
 IV probit   
IV 
probit 
  IV 
probit 
  
Log likelihood -3739.844            
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test 
for over identification  
 
 
3.992 
  
(p-value 
0.136) 
NA    1.072  (p-value 
0.301) 
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(b) 
Figure 1. 2 The moderating effect of firm age 
Figure 1.2 (a) reports the estimated moderating effect of firm age from the probit model, which is a 
function of the estimated probability of innovation. Figure 1.2 (b) reports the significance levels for 
each observation. The moderating effect of age is overall positive for all observations. 
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However, when we include an interaction effect between small firms and family 
finance in the third specification, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant in an IV probit model. Similar estimation of the interaction effect of equity 
finance for small firms does not generate significant results (specification 4).  This 
suggests that, overall both equity finance and family finance support innovation by 
financially constrained emerging economy firms, but family finance plays an 
important role mainly for small firms.  
The significance of equity finance also points to the significance of the private 
equity market (i.e., equity transactions outside of the stock markets) for financing of 
innovation in the emerging economy context. Building on previous research on 
American high-technology firms we hypothesized that, generally for innovators, 
equity finance is more conducive than bank finance to innovation investment. 
However, the development of public stock markets may be incomplete in many of our 
sample countries, and as a consequence, firms may need to seek private equity funding 
or informal private lenders (family and friends) which are relatively less costly to them 
than debt financing. 
Finally, we study whether the macro environment moderates the effect of external 
finance availability on innovation probability. In the same way, we added interaction 
terms between political constraints (POLCONIII) and external finance, and between 
literacy level and external finance, to the original empirical model. The results in Table 
1.7 show that the estimated interaction effect of literacy and external finance is not 
significant, and the graphical interaction effect analysis shows the moderating effect of 
literacy is generally positive in Figure 1.3 but not statistically significant.  
In contrast, the interaction between political constraints and external finance 
obtains a positive and significant coefficient in the probit model. To characterize the 
effect in a clear way, we interact innovation with a zero political veto power indicator 
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Table 1. 7 The moderating effects of literacy and political constraints (N=6940) 
Notes: Dependent variable: Any innovation. The external finance variable and the interaction term are instrumented in the second and the fourth 
specifications. Instruments include the firm-level survey question regarding auditing, country-industry averages of external finance excluding the focal firm, 
and country-level concentration of the financial market. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; ** and * indicate confidence levels 
of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
 Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. Coeff.  S.E. 
Constant -0.148  0.632 0.975  2.909 -0.390  0.626 -2.116 * 0.886 
External finance    -0.001  0.002 -0.042  0.072 -0.001  0.001 0.038  0.025 
External finance*literacy 0.00004  0.000 0.001  0.001       
External finance*political constraints       0.013 *** 0.002 -0.496  0.885 
Internal finance (industry) 0.007 *** 0.001 0.034 *** 0.007 0.006 *** 0.001 0.041  0.007 
Gov. ownership -0.002 ** 0.001 0.003 ** 0.002 -0.002 ** 0.001 0.026 *** 0.009 
Age<10 0.125 *** 0.037 0.085  0.062 0.122 *** 0.037 0.074  0.054 
Medium-sized 0.097 ** 0.042 0.126 * 0.071 0.106 ** 0.042 0.152 * 0.082 
Large 0.313 *** 0.052 0.212 ** 0.087 0.326 *** 0.053 0.149 ** 0.062 
Foreign ownership 0.694  0.060 0.454 *** 0.152 0.048  0.060 0.544 *** 0.155 
Exports 0.390 *** 0.054 0.172  0.110 0.386 *** 0.055 0.318 * 0.172 
Training 0.331 *** 0.043 0.348 *** 0.068 0.349 *** 0.047 0.341 *** 0.083 
Political constraints 1.241 *** 1.241 0.385  0.288 0.962 *** 0.138 0.496  0.885 
Literacy 0.003  0.002 -0.028  0.035 0.013 *** 0.002 0.011 ** 0.006 
             
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Country dummies No   No   No   No  
             
Estimation method Probit   IV probit   Probit   IV   
Log likelihood -3761.45      -3745.46      
Pseudo R2 0.080      0.084      
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test for 
overidentification  
 
 
0.258  
  
(p-value
 0.611)  
    1.802  (p-value 
0.180) 
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(b) 
Figure 1. 3 The moderating effect of literacy 
Figure 1.3 (a) reports the estimated moderating effect of literacy from the probit model, which is a 
function of the estimated probability of innovation. Figure 1.3 (b) reports the significance levels for 
each observation. The moderating effect of literacy is overall positive for all observations but the 
positive effect decrease when a firm has high probability of innovation. 
 
  40 
 
 
-.0025
-.002
-.0015
-.001
-.0005
0
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
Ef
fe
ct
 
(pe
rc
e
nt
a
ge
 
po
in
ts
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
Interaction Effects after Probit
 
(a) 
-5
0
5
10
z-
st
a
tis
tic
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1
z-statistics of Interaction Effects after Probit
 
(b) 
Figure 1. 4 The moderating effect of political constraints 
Figure 1.4 (a) reports the estimated moderating effect of political constraint from the probit model, 
which is a function of the estimated probability of innovation. Figure 1.4 (b) reports the significance 
levels for each observation. The moderating effect of zero political constraint is significantly negative 
for all observations except when a firm has high probability of innovation.  
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and do an interaction effect analysis in Figure 1.4，which reports the estimated 
interaction effect form the probit models as a function of the estimated probability of 
innovation in (a) and the significance levels for each observation in (b). Here, the 
interaction effect is negative for most of the observations. As the probability of 
innovation approaches one, the interaction effect is not significant any more. A 
speculative interpretation is that, in general, a better political environment will reduce 
political and financial risk, resulting in more demand for external finance because 
innovation investments become more attractive. Under these conditions, innovating 
firms are highly financially constrained, and exogenous changes in the availability of 
finance will generate a strong impact on innovation. In contrast, for some firms that 
are highly likely to innovate, the influence of the political environment is less 
important. In other words, when the political institutions are good, financial markets 
are effective at sorting innovative firms from non-innovative ones, and highly 
innovative firms are more likely to obtain the external funding they need.  
1.5  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between external financing and innovation 
investment of firms using the cross-sectional and cross-country World Bank Enterprise 
Survey. We focus on firms in Asian and Central European emerging economies and 
find that external financing significantly influences the propensity of innovation both 
in simple probit models and in instrumental variable models. Secondly, we study the 
effects of different sources of external financing on the probability of innovation 
investment. In some contrast to previous research that has mainly emphasized internal 
finance and also found that R&D intensive firms tend to have lower leverage than 
other firms, we find that both equity and family finance have significant and positive 
effects on innovation. As the great majority of the sampled emerging-economy firms 
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are privately held, this result suggests that the development of the private equity 
markets and other informal financing channels (family and friends) are important in 
emerging economy contexts. We suggest that a closer analysis of private-equity 
funding for innovation investments, apart from the special case of venture capital, 
might be a promising research avenue. 
Last but not least, we investigate the moderating effects of firm age and size, 
orientation toward product or process innovation, and country-level political 
constraints and literacy. We find that smaller firms experience stronger financial 
constraints and are more likely to benefit from finance from family or friends for their 
innovation activities. The evidence of firm age and product vs. process innovation is 
inconclusive—both product and process innovation activities appear to benefit from 
availability of external finance. Furthermore, the effects of external finance 
significantly depend on the institutional environment.  
Whereas earlier research has primarily studied publicly-traded companies from 
the United States, our study highlights that the results for different types of samples 
may diverge, and our understanding of the fundamental drivers of innovation 
investments would benefit from explicit attention to the institutional settings in which 
firms are embedded. Our results emphasize the importance of transparent and efficient 
financial markets and institutions that reduce information asymmetries between 
innovators and potential investors. It also provides managerial insights regarding the 
financial challenges of innovation and building growth-oriented companies in 
emerging economies. Innovators are generally better off developing relationships that 
provide access to private equity investors rather than seeking investment funding from 
the commercial banking sector. 
In summary, we have shed new light on the effect of external finance on 
innovation investment decisions in Asian and Eastern European emerging economies. 
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We find that external financing, especially funding from equity markets and from 
friends and family provide significant financial resources for firms’ innovation 
investments. Whereas the public equity markets are not mature in most of the analyzed 
economies, private equity financing still has a significant positive effect on innovation 
investment. We argue that financial development is a critical enabler of innovation in a 
broad set of service and manufacturing firms. Although there may be a “pecking 
order” in which firms actually choose the sources of finance for their innovation 
activities, equity, as well as family and friends play important roles in different stages 
of firm growth and innovation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DOES INNOVATION AFFECT CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS? 
- EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The first paper of my dissertation studied the effects of external finance sources on 
innovation investment outcomes in Asian emerging economies. Under the hypothesis 
that investment of firms are subject to financial constraints, especially for the risky 
R&D and innovation investments, we focused on how each of the financing sources 
including financing from banks, equity market, friends and family and other informal 
sources affect the innovation investment outcome. We found that by controlling 
internal finance, equity finance is significantly more important for promoting 
innovation than debt finance across a set of emerging economies in Asia. In addition, 
we find that for small-size and young firms the effect of equity is especially stronger 
than that of banks. A particularly interesting finding in our conclusion is that the effect 
of external finance on innovation is stronger for a country under a democratic system, 
i.e. with political players who have veto power in the system. We are among the first 
to study the detailed relations between innovation outcome and financing sources 
beyond debt and equity.  
Given that R&D and innovation investment are risky with uncertain outcomes and 
are financially constrained, a natural extension is to examine how innovation affects 
future capital structure decisions. Is the impact on firms’ capital structure the same for 
all types of firms? 
In this paper, in order to complete the picture of the relation between innovation 
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and finance and understand how the two important engines for firms’ growth and 
development evolve, we are going to explore the questions above and focus on the 
People’s Republic of China, the biggest emerging economy in the world which has 
been undergoing rapid economic growth and reforms since 1970s.   
With a panel data based on the Investment Climate Survey from the World Bank 
including 2400 firms across 18 cities in China from 2000 to 2002, we focus on 
whether innovation, which is important for promoting the economic growth of firm 
and which involves great information asymmetry problem for financing, can 
exacerbate the capital constraints and influence the future capital structure decisions.  
To my knowledge, this paper is among the first to study the effects of innovation 
on capital structure decisions and the first to do so with data from China. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature and 
the theoretical framework of innovation’s impact on capital structures. The section 
ends with testable empirical hypotheses. Section 2.3 discusses the data. Section 2.4 
introduces the empirical model. Section 2.5 discusses the regression results. Section 
2.6 concludes. 
2.2  Literature Review  
2.2.1  The Innovation Environment in China 
Technological innovation has played an important role in business success and has 
frequently been considered as crucial to organizational competitiveness and success in 
a dynamic and turbulent market environment (Maurer, 1999; Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; 
Schumpeter, 1975). Following the call of “Technology is the first productivity” in the 
by the political leader and reformer, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese government has put 
forth various policies in promoting national technological innovation capabilities. 
Since then, China’s technological innovation policies have experienced complicated 
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and diverse changes, which have significantly strengthened China’s international 
competitiveness. From 1985 to 2003, there were more than 200 technological 
innovation policies issued in China (Chen et.al 2006).  
In the meantime, China has achieved a spectacularly high rate of economic 
growth over a sustained period of more than two decades. Nevertheless, today China 
faces the challenge of making the transition from sustained to sustainable growth from 
social, economical, ecological and environmental points of view. Innovation has been 
identified as a major engine for the new growth model, which plays an important role 
in promoting economic and social development. The Chinese government has 
launched a national strategy to build an innovation-driven economy and society by 
2020 (OECD 2008).  
Extant research shows that the Chinese government is directly and indirectly 
involved in innovation development through policy tools (Roessner 1988; Rothwell & 
Zegveld 1981) of three major types: supply-oriented, demand-oriented, and indirect 
(environment-oriented) innovation policy (Rothwell & Zegveld 1988). Government 
supply-side innovation policies provide funds, human resources, and technical 
infrastructure to encourage firm innovation. In many defense-related innovations, the 
government also carries out demand-oriented innovation policies through government 
procurement. Supply-oriented innovation policies seem to be the most popular form 
and include the provision of an intellectual infrastructure, skilled and educated 
workforce, risk capital, base capital, and technical assistance to new businesses 
(Goldsmith 1990). 
While the macro environment and government policies have a positive influence 
on innovation, whether it can be translated into firm-level productivity is not clear. 
One of the important reasons is that innovation is a type of risky investment which 
could be facing the financing constraints problem.  
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2.2.2  Theoretical Background 
A fundamental challenge for corporate finance lies in understanding the 
determinants of capital structure heterogeneity (Lemmon Roberts and Zender 2006). 
Earlier research has examined the dynamic behavior of leverage ratios in order to 
distinguish among competing explanations. Several studies have focused on how firms 
respond to various shocks affecting capital structure (Alti 2005, Flannery and Rangan 
2005, Leary and Roberts 2005a, and Strebulaev 2004), while others have focused on 
how historical factors affect current capital structure (e.g. Baker and Wurgler 2002, 
Welch 2004), and Kayhan and Titman (2004).  
While the majority of the research results have been derived from developed 
economies that have many institutional similarities, little work has been done to 
further the knowledge of capital structure within developing countries that have 
different institutional structures. Previous findings (Booth et al. 2001) suggest that 
although some of the insights from modern finance theories are applicable across 
countries, much remains to be done to understand the impact of different institutional 
features on capital structure choices.  
 
2.2.2.1  Capital structure determinants 
The pecking order theory of capital structure is among the most influential theories of 
corporate leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that information asymmetry 
between managers and investors creates a preference ranking over financing sources, 
beginning with internal funds, followed by debt and equity. Since then, a great amount 
of research within finance on capital structure has been inspired. While this model 
explains many observed patterns in corporate financing, Leary and Roberts (2007) 
reviewed the contradictory empirical evidence of pecking order of recent studies and 
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there is no clear agreement regarding whether the pecking order accurately describes 
observed financing behaviors.  
 Comparing with the above tension present in existing empirical evidences, a 
number of papers (e.g. Titman and Wessels 1988, Fama and French 2002) tested the 
negative correlation between leverage and profitability as evidence and supported for 
the pecking order’s prediction that managers prefer to use internal funds before turning 
to debt.  
Alternatively, there have been many empirical studies based on the trade-off 
theory and signaling models of capital structure. The development of agency theory in 
the 1980s has lead to the current mainstream view that corporations act as if there is a 
unique, optimal capital structure for individual firms that results from a trade-off 
between the tax benefits of increasing leverage and the increasing agency and 
bankruptcy costs higher debt entails. Signaling models, which were also derived from 
asymmetric information problems, suggest that managers use leverage to signal firm 
prospects to poorly informed outside investors who believe these signals because they 
are prohibitively costly for weak firms to mimic (Ross, 1977). Most of the work has 
been to identify the determinants of capital structure, attempting to test the explanatory 
power of capital structure models on corporate behavior in developed countries, 
particularly in the U.S setting. The main determinants tested include profitability, size, 
growth opportunity, asset tangibility, etc.  
 
2.2.2.2  Innovation and capital structure choices 
Implied by the pecking order theory, the firm will fund all projects using retained 
earnings if possible. If there is an inadequate amount of retained earnings, then debt 
financing will be used. However, when a firm has invested in R&D or innovation 
projects with uncertain results and risks, will this investment behavior influence this 
  53 
financing order?  
Previous literature analyzed the above question in two different ways. First, there 
have been extensive studies about the existence of financing constraints of R&D and 
innovation investments. R&D investments that are characterized by a high degree of 
risk and opaqueness are associated with lower leverage (Vincente-Lorente 2001), i.e. 
the asymmetry of information between shareholders, creditors and firm managers, 
together with the limited liability financial structure, impacts the investment decisions 
of firms (Maurer 1999). The argument of the negative correlation between R&D 
spending and leverage ratio lies in that investments in R&D creating intangible assets 
will likely suffer from market failure (i.e. they cannot be efficiently traded on the open 
market) and hence they cannot serve as effective collateral to support a high level of 
debt (Simerly and Li 2000, Vincente-Lorente 2001). 
Recent empirical work has extended the determinants of leverage and implicated 
innovation as a determinant of leverage. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and 
Mecking (1976), the possibility for the investment and financing decisions to interact 
is acknowledged by researchers and a series of studies have been initiated to 
investigate how competitive strategies can influence capital structure. Jordan, Lowe, 
and Taylor (1998) investigated the relationship between capital structure and 
innovation and found that a strategy based on innovation was associated with the 
lowest level of debt, while firms pursuing a cost-leadership strategy had the highest 
level of debt. The strand of literature on corporate strategy generally assumes that 
firms operate in a market economy, where property rights are well defined and 
protected. Since the emerging economy context appears to be substantially different 
from those in developed economies, theories and research developed in those settings 
may have limited applicability to the transitional economy context such as in China. 
As these economies move to market-based, improved knowledge about managerial 
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decision-making including the choices of innovation clearly becomes more and more 
important for theory development and practice (Tan 2001). 
2.2.3  Empirical Hypotheses 
The Chinese Banking structure has been inherited from the socialist planned economy. 
While it has deprived emerging private enterprises from accessing external funding, 
the Chinese banking sector has traditionally been considered by the authorities as a 
substitute for state financing in order to ensure continued funding to preserve jobs in 
its many inefficient but massive state-owned enterprises.  
Up until 1998, the four state-owned commercial banks including Bank of China, 
China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the 
Agriculture Bank of China were instructed to lend to state-owned enterprises. During 
the mid-1990s, Chinese authorities took the steps to reform the financial system 
through recapitalization and transferring non-performing loans to asset management 
companies. The system was liberalized at the end of 1990s, when the Chinese 
constitution acknowledged the private sector to be an integral part of the economy. 
However, despite the fact that China has a very large and deep pool of financial 
capital - an estimated US$4.5 trillion of assets (McKinsey Global Institute2) - 
relatively few firms in China have access to formal finance (Hallward-Driemeier et al. 
2003). Based on the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) on investment 
climate conduced in 80 countries during 1999-2000, 80% of private firms in China 
cited financing constraints as a major obstacle. This figure - twice the median figure of 
the sample (38.5%) - ranks China as the most financially constrained country ahead of 
Haiti (74.4%) and Kyrgyz Republic (66.7%). Approximately a quarter of the 2,200 
domestic firms interviewed in the World Bank investment climate survey (2003) have 
neither a bank loan nor a loan from any other financial institutions, and on average 
                                                        
2
 http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/mckinseynews/financialreform.asp 
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only about 25% of firms’ working capital comes from bank loans. Some research 
suggests that the financial intermediation and the banking reform are far from efficient 
in the mid-1990s (Park and Sehrt 2001). Theoretically, lending quota, the maximum 
amount of loan for firms, no longer exists. However, in practice, banks still consider 
private enterprises to be riskier than their public peers, either due to the short credit 
history or smaller chances of being bailed out by the government. The ability of the 
Chinese financial system to allocate capital more efficiently and to guarantee 
non-distortionary financial access to all companies, including private firms, is 
therefore a key indicator of the success of the ongoing reforms.  
The predictions on profitability are ambiguous. In tradeoff theory, the profitable 
firms should be more highly levered to offset corporate taxes. In many asymmetric 
information models, such as Ross (1977), profitable firms are predicted to have higher 
leverage. However, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002) show that 
this is not a common finding. Instead, the literature finds profits and leverage to be 
negatively correlated, which is consistent with the pecking order theory. The negative 
relation can be interpreted beyond the pecking order theory (Frank and Goyal 2003). 
One perspective is that firms may face fixed costs of adjustment. When a firm earns 
profit, debt gets paid off and leverage falls automatically. When it comes to China, I 
expect to find a negative relation between profitability and leverage. Compared with 
private firms, I especially expect that the relation will be more prominent for the 
state-owned firms for the following two reasons. On one hand, firms in China prefer to 
use internal finance first because external financing is not easily and widely accessible 
for firms because of the under developed economic and financial system. On the other 
hand, when a firm deplete its internal finance, it would be easier for a state-owned 
firm to get finance than that of a private firm, which implies a stronger relationship 
between profitability and leverage for the former one. What’s more, for private firms, 
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because of their limited credit history and potential higher default risk, the effect of 
profitability on leverage could be positive if the bank or other financing sources use 
the profitability as an indicator of the quality of the firms according to the signal 
theory. 
 
Hypothesis 1 Firms in China are credit constrained. The leverage ratio is negatively 
related with the profitability of a firm. But the relation between profitability and 
leverage ratio is weaker for private firms than for state-owned firms in China. 
 
According to the investment literature, R&D and innovation are investments with high 
uncertainty and risk. They are sensitive to the internal finance and profit of a firm. 
When a firm has innovation investments, the demand of external financing including 
debt financing will increase. However, the supply of loans will be different for 
different types of firms in China. A state-owned firm, no matter conducting innovative 
projects or not, is assumed to have less default risk because of the potential bail out 
from the government. Therefore, it will be easier for state-owned firms to get loans 
from banks than for private firms. Furthermore, considering the tradition of the 
economic system in China, it would be easier for state-owned firms to get other 
external finance in general. Therefore, I expect that the ultimate equilibrium leverage 
ratio will increase for state-owned firms. For private firms, there could be two 
outcomes regarding the impact of innovation investment on future leverage ratio. The 
future leverage ratio can either increase or decrease, depending on whether firms can 
get loans or not.  
 
Hypothesis 2 Innovation investment is positively related to future leverage ratio for 
state-owned firms in China. The impact of innovation investment on leverage ratio for 
  57 
private firms could be positive but not as large as state-owned firms. 
 
The first hypothesis analyzed the relation between profitability and corporate leverage 
in China. The most important assumption that firms are constrained by external 
finance and prefer to use internal finance first is derived from China’s traditional 
economics system. When a firm has innovation investments in the current stage, 
compared with the situation without such investments, it will use more retained 
earnings to support the innovation projects, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, the demand 
for external financing will increase and the firm needs more external debt financing 
according to the pecking order theory. 
 
Hypothesis 3 Innovation investment can affect the relation between profitability and 
leverage. The negative relation between profitability and leverage will be strengthened 
when a firm has innovation investment.  
2.3  Data 
The variables in the study are from the firm-level Investment Climate Survey 
conducted in 2003 by the World Bank in collaboration with the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics. The population primarily encompasses non-listed companies in 
China, including a small percentage of state-owned firms. 
Accountants and personnel managers from a total of 2400 firms were interviewed 
in 18 Chinese cities in 15 provinces: Benxi(Liaoning), Changchun(Jilin), 
Changsha(Hunan), Chongqing(Chongqing), Dalian(Liaoning), Guiyang(Guizhou), 
Ha’erbin(Heilongjiang), Hangzhou(Zhejiang), Jiangmen(Guangdong), 
Kunming(Yunnan), Lanzhou(Gansu), Nanchang(Jiangxi), Nanning(Guangxi), 
Shenzhen(Guangdong), Wenzhou(Zhejiang), Wuhan(Hubei),Xi’an(Shanxi), 
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Zhengzhou(Henan). The locations of the cities range from the northeast to the 
southwest part of China. 
None of the firms entered or exited within the observation period. The ages of 
firms range from 3 to 53. In addition, the non-listing criteria also ensures that the 
capital structure was not distorted by the effects of a recent official listing. The data 
include annual accounting information on sales, inputs, labor, capital stock, investment 
and several other expenditures from 1999 to 2002; information about broad firm 
characteristics is also included, such as the ownership structure, labor force 
characteristics, relations with competitors, clients and suppliers, innovation, market 
environment and investment climate. While the survey was conducted in 2003, finance 
and accounting information regarding sales, expenses on operation, management and 
interests, profit, liabilities, and investments are available annually; other information 
such as the ownership structure and innovation activities are measured only once 
between 1999 to 2002.  
Among the 2,400 firms, around 1,800 of them correspond to 14 different 3-digit 
level industries in the manufacturing sector, including garment and leather products, 
electronic equipment, electronic part-making, household electronics, auto and 
auto-parts, information technology, food processing, chemical products and medicine, 
biotech products and Chinese medicine, metallurgical products and Transportation 
equipment. The other 600 firms are in the service sector, including accounting and 
non-banking financial services, advertising and marketing, and business services. 
By eliminating firms that are undergoing bankruptcy, we keep firms with positive 
values of total sales and assets. In addition, we eliminate firms with negative debt, 
interest payments and investment, whose information can not be reasonably 
interpreted in the balance sheet. The final sample, after considering any missing data, 
consists of around 1,900 firms. 
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2.4 Empirical Model  
2.4.1  The Model 
Since the sample contains data across firms and over time, the basic regression model 
explaining firms’ leverage can be specified as follows: 
' '
1it it i itLEV X Z uα β γ−= + + +  
Where i denotes the cross-section dimension and t indicates the time dimension, ' 1itX −  
is a 1 k×  vector of observations on k explanatory variables for the  ith firm in the 
t-1th period, 'iZ  represents firm level time-invariant variables (including state-owned 
firm indicator and innovation variable), β  is a 1k × vector parameters, itu is a 
disturbance term defined as it i itu µ υ= + where iµ  denotes the unobservable 
individual effect and itυ  denotes the remainder disturbance. 
  
2.4.2  Variables  
2.4.2.1  Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used to test the hypothesis is firm-level leverage ratio (LEV), 
which is computed through dividing the book value of total liability by the total assets 
of the firm. The total liability contains both long-term and short-term liabilities. 
Although the strict notion of capital structure refers exclusively to long-term leverage, 
we decide to include short-term liability mainly because Chinese firms use either 
very-little or no long-term capital. In our sample, the mean value of overall leverage is 
0.54. The long-term leverage ratio is only 0.06, a much lower value.  
 
2.4.2.2  Independent Variables 
The estimation model includes dummies by city and sector to control the unobservable 
characteristics at the city and sector level. It is expected that most variance in financial 
development and institutional characteristics will be captured by the dummies. 
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In this survey, firms were asked to answer the types of innovation they had 
introduced since 1999. The five types of innovation are 1) Introduced new products in 
existing business; 2) Entered new business line; 3) New Process improvement; 4) New 
Management techniques; 5) New quality controls in production. The variable 
INNOVATION  is the total of innovation investment types at the firm level, ranging 
from 0 and 5 to represent the innovation intensity of the firms.  
The primary independent variable of interest is total innovation investment 
categories, which is used to proxy the real innovation investment extent of a firm. As 
the level of investment in innovation is unobservable, the key assumption for this 
variable is that the more innovation investment categories a firm has, the more finance 
will go into innovation investment.  
For an alternative innovation variable, I use a binary indicator for innovation to 
study the effect of innovation on leverage ratio, which shows similar result to the 
innovation category variable. 
Table 2.1 lists the main financial variables I am using in the empirical analysis. 
All variables in this table are calculated on an annual basis. The mean values of 
innovation categories, binary innovation indicator, overall leverage and short-term 
leverage ratios are summarized by cities and sectors in Panel A and Panel B of Table 
2.2. Hangzhou, located in the Yangtze River Delta, an area with the highest economic 
growth rate in China, has the highest mean value both in innovation categories and 
innovation binary indication, 3.145 and 0.895 respectively. In contrast, Benxi, a 
medium-sized city in Liaoning province, northeastern part of China, has the lowest 
mean value of innovation in this sample. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show the average 
innovation level in each of the city and sector. The table also indicates that innovation 
categories are highly correlated with the binary innovation indicator. What’s more, we 
can also find that the overall leverage ratios are much higher than the long-term 
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Table 2. 1 Measurement of financial variables 
 
 
Main financial variable  Measurements 
Dependent variables  
Overall Leverage (LEV) Ratio of book value of total debt to total assets 
Long-term Leverage(LLEV) Ratio of book value of long term debt to total assets 
  
Independent variables  
Profitability Ratio of operating income before interest,  
 tax and depreciation to total assets 
Size Logarithm of total assets 
Tangibility(Asset Structure) Ratio of tangible assets(the sum of inventory  
 and fixed assets)to total assets 
Capital intensity Ratio of book value of total assets to total sale 
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Table 2. 2 Panel A: Mean value of Innovation and Leverage ratio in China by sector 
 
Sector Innovation Any Overall Long-term N 
 Categories Innovation Leverage Leverage  
Garment & leather products 1.870 0.667 0.564 0.056 259 
Electronic equipment 2.946 0.885 0.521 0.039 146 
Electronic parts making 2.573 0.802 0.570 0.056 223 
Household electronic 3.021 0.830 0.547 0.024 49 
Auto & auto parts 2.666 0.809 0.596 0.081 290 
Information technology 2.119 0.726 0.451 0.031 161 
Accounting &non-banking financial service 1.150 0.480 0.496 0.139 120 
Advertisement & marketing 1.294 0.580 0.484 0.032 113 
Business services 1.350 0.573 0.483 0.115 207 
Food processing 2.462 0.731 0.555 0.076 56 
Chemical products &medicine 2.250 0.769 0.626 0.108 50 
Biotech products & Chinese medicine 2.893 0.857 0.562 0.059 30 
Metallurgical products 1.784 0.696 0.595 0.058 119 
Transportation equipments 1.415 0.561 0.453 0.047 40 
Total 2.097 0.710 0.539 0.068 1863 
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Table 2.2  Panel B:Mean value of Innovation and Leverage ratio 
 in China by city 
 
City Innovation  Any   Overall  Long-term   Obs. 
 Categories Innovation Leverage  Leverage  
Benxi 1.315  0.534  0.561  0.063  73 
Changchun 2.303  0.770  0.554  0.081  122 
Changsha 2.435  0.800  0.549  0.067  108 
Chongqing 2.752  0.816  0.584  0.094  125 
Dalian 2.014  0.704  0.500  0.072  71 
Guiyang 2.196  0.696  0.576  0.094  98 
Haerbin 2.155  0.691  0.520  0.067  110 
Hangzhou 3.145  0.895  0.577  0.051  76 
Jiangmen 1.962  0.722  0.532  0.062  79 
Kunming 1.813  0.667  0.534  0.075  123 
Lanzhou 1.303  0.580  0.554  0.057  114 
Nanchang 2.135  0.698  0.501  0.073  123 
Nanning 1.839  0.634  0.527  0.068  108 
Shenzhen 2.141  0.679  0.495  0.022  78 
Wenzhou 2.115  0.701  0.473  0.035  83 
Wuhan 2.341  0.770  0.520  0.091  126 
Xian 2.198  0.754  0.571  0.064  122 
Zhengzhou 1.589  0.645  0.540  0.054  124 
Total 2.097  0.710  0.539  0.068  1863 
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Figure 2. 1  Innovation by city 
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Figure 2. 2  Innovation by sector 
 
  65 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Notes: Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics of the innovation variables and key financial variables in 
line with the capital structure literature.  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
          
Innovation 2.097149 1.789168 0 5 
Binary Innovation 0.7101373 0.4537284 0 1 
Profit 5979.969 98666.86 -2708410 5413730 
Asset 214070.2 1280547 4.8 5.98E+07 
Sale 119403.3 706375.9 0 3.03E+07 
Leverage 0.5390241 0.2556683 0 0.9997931 
Profitability 0.0454041 1.210024 -19.2428 72.13071 
Capital Intensity 8.39605 145.5392 0.0001563 7099.595 
Tangibility  1.068224 12.27065 0.0007214 564.2918 
Size  9.153769 2.228569 -0.2231435 17.22603 
Government ownership 20.76164 39.24695 0 100 
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leverage ratios. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the key variables used in the empirical capital structure 
determinants model. 
2.5  Econometric Analysis 
As the dataset contains multiple observations per firm, I will attempt to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity using panel data methods. Two of the most common 
approaches for modeling this type of panel data are: (a) random-effects (RE) models; 
(b) fixed-effects (FE) models. Although a fixed-effects model would be preferred to a 
random-effects design, it has a critical shortcoming regarding the present study 
because the innovation variable is time-invariant. Because the firm fixed effects 
capture all factors that are constant within a firm over time, the fixed effects models 
cannot produce stable estimates for variables that are either invariant or display little 
change within a firm over the time.   
 Alternatively, we first analyze the data using the pooled OLS and random effects 
model to estimate the main regression function. Both pooled OLS and the RE 
estimator make use of the between and the within variation, while the RE estimator 
does so in an efficient way. Since leverage changes very slowly, and it may take some 
time for actual leverage ratios to approach the ‘optimum’ level in response to shift in 
the optimum, all independent variables were lagged 1 year for the leverage models. A 
proper interpretation of this model is that a change in an independent variable at time 
t-1 will be associated with a change in leverage between time t-1 and time t.  
Since the Pooled OLS relies on a between comparison, the estimate for the 
coefficient of innovation variable can be biased because of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Actually, even if the analysis could be conducted with fixed effect 
regression, the problem can not be resolved completely. Therefore, for further analysis,
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we use IV estimation method. The city-sector level of innovation excluding the focal 
firm is highly correlated with the firm-level innovation variable, but not the error term. 
Neither will it affect the firm leverage ration directly according to the assumption of 
the IV method.  
 
2.5.1  Profitability and Leverage 
In order to estimate the effect of the independent variables on the overall leverage, we 
first consider the Pooled OLS econometric approach to estimate the model. Under the 
hypothesis that there is no group or individual effects among the firms in the sample, I 
estimate the models with full sample. The results of the OLS regression and random 
effects used to test Hypothesis 1 are reported in Table 2.4.  
By controlling the key variables, profitability, size (log of assets), tangibility and 
capital intensity, which are conventionally in line with the literature studying capital 
structure determinants, the four models test the first empirical hypothesis and the table 
summarizes the results by using Pooled OLS and random effects regressions. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms in China are financially constrained. The negative 
relationship between profitability and the leverage ratio implies that retained profit is 
the quickest and easiest source of finance for most companies. The result of the 
negative coefficient of profit also supports the Pecking Order model hypothesis.  
In terms of tangibility, there are two different perspectives in interpreting the sign 
of the coefficient. The common idea is based on the hypothesis that collateral supports 
debt, and tangible assets are easy to collateralize in both developed and developing 
countries. Therefore, the usual prediction for the coefficient of tangibility is positive. 
However, one might expect that firms with few tangible assets would have greater 
asymmetric information problems, which makes firms with few tangible assets 
accumulate more debt over time and become more highly levered (Harris and Raviv 
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Table 2. 4 Determinants of capital structure in China with Full Sample 
 
Notes: Table 2.4 reports regression of the capital structure determinants including innovation with full 
sample. The dependent variable for each column is firm-level leverage ratio. Standard errors in 
parentheses; ***, **,* denote significance at 1%. 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Random Effects  Random Effects 
Innovation -0.0044* -0.0098*** -0.0022 -0.0079** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Profitability -0.0102** -0.0091** -0.0013 -0.0012 
 (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Capital Intensity 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Tangibility -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Size 0.0107*** 0.0115*** 0.0056** 0.0053* 
 (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
State_Owned 0.0036 0.0229** 0.0087 0.0277* 
 (0.0099) (0.0105) (0.0134) (0.0142) 
_cons 0.4508*** 0.4953*** 0.4911*** 0.5413*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0312) (0.0226) (0.0404) 
Sector Dummies  Yes  Yes 
City Dummies  Yes  Yes 
N 3577 3577 3577 3577 
F 5.8433 6.1583     
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1991). In the regressions of this paper, we do not find a significant result for the 
coefficient. In addition, the positive effect of size is also consistent with previous 
literature (Rajan and Zingales 1995, Hovakimian et al., 2000). Capital intensity is 
usually included in the capital structure determinants model to control a firm’s 
efficiency in deployment of its assets, which indicates how much money is invested to 
produce one dollar of sales revenue. In our analysis, we find that capital intensity 
consistantly has significant positive effect on leverage ratio for private firms in China, 
which implies that the efficiency of private firms is important for getting finance from 
banks while the relation is not clear for state-owned firms.  
In Table 2.4, we find that being a state-owned company has a positive effect on 
the leverage ratio of firms in China. To test for the different ownership effects, I split 
the sample into private and state-owned companies, the results of which are reported 
in Table 2.5. One of the most significant differences between state-owned firms and 
private firms is the relation between profitability and leverage ratios. The negative 
marginal effect of profitability on leverage is stronger for state-owned firms than for 
private firms. 
As introduced at the beginning of this paper, state-owned firms were protected by 
the government and had easier access to external funding from the Chinese banking 
sector before the reform of the financial system in mid-1990s. Even though the current 
financial system allocates capital more efficiently and guarantees more financial 
access to all companies, including private firms, the Chinese financial environment 
still maintains some features of a centrally planned economy. If the government does 
not change its controlling behavior towards state-owned enterprises, those firms are 
less likely to run into financial crisis compared with their private sectors counterparts. 
The implication of the weaker negative relation between profitability and leverage 
ratio for private firms is that the pecking order phenomenon, i.e. the negative relation
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Table 2. 5 Determinants of Capital Structure in China: State-owned V.S. 
Private Firms 
 
Notes: Table 2.5 compares investigation of determinants of capital structure for firms in China for 
state-owned firms and private firms. The dependent variable for each column is firm-level leverage ratio. 
Standard errors in parentheses;***, **,* denote significance at 1%. 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Dependent variable: Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 State owned Private State owned Private State owned Private 
Independent variables Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Random Effects Random Effects 
Innovation 0.0009 -0.0069** -0.0138** -0.0096*** 0.0074 -0.0074* 
 (0.0057) (0.0029) (0.0058) (0.0029) (0.0077) (0.0039) 
Profitability -0.5915*** -0.0095** -0.5379*** -0.0090* -0.2642*** -0.0012 
 (0.1106) (0.0047) (0.1117) (0.0046) (0.0829) (0.0020) 
Capital intensity 0.0003 0.0001*** 0.0003 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Tangibility -0.0705*** -0.0000 -0.0444*** 0.0003 -0.0242** 0.0001 
 (0.0126) (0.0004) (0.0130) (0.0004) (0.0115) (0.0004) 
Size 0.0093** 0.0124*** 0.0044 0.0158*** -0.0009 0.0091*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0024) (0.0053) (0.0027) (0.0058) (0.0030) 
_cons 0.5010*** 0.4410*** 0.4366*** 0.5347*** 0.5591*** 0.5853*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0212) (0.0721) (0.0360) (0.0541) (0.0464) 
Sector dummies   Yes Yes  Yes 
City dummies   Yes Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.0754 0.0121 0.2033 0.0591   
N 759 2818 759 2818 759 2818 
F 12.2870*** 6.8647*** 5.2708*** 4.9963***     
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between profit and debt financing, is more evident when an enterprise has more access 
to debt financing.  
 
2.5.2  Innovation and Capital Structure 
Empirically, financing constraints for risky R&D and innovation investment could be 
identified by testing the sensitivity of investment to internal funds because it is 
assumed that external finance is more costly than internal finance due to asymmetric 
information and agency problems. Controlling for other factors, the relation between 
investment and measures of internal funds is significantly positive (Himmelberg and 
Petersen 1994, Kaplan and Zingales 1997, Alti 2003 and Gomes 2001). Based on the 
results above from the literature, how will current innovation investment affect future 
capital structure decisions?  
To investigate the relation, I include a variable INNOVATION which proxies the 
innovation investment of firms in the capital structure equation, both as a main effect 
and as interaction with the profitability variable. One of the key questions addressed in 
this paper is to identify whether innovation -a type of financially constrained 
investment- can affect the future capital structure decisions. When a firm has 
innovation investment, will the relation between profitability and innovation be 
consistent with the prediction of the pecking order hypothesis? 
 In the regressions with the full sample as shown in Table 2.4, the lagged 
innovation investment has a significant negative effect across all of the firms when we 
control the city level and industry level fixed effects. When we separate the firms into 
private and public firms, we can see that the negative effect of innovation on leverage 
ratio is significant for all the private firms but not state-owned firms. The effects of 
firm-level innovation investment on leverage ratio choice are not stable across all of 
the models.  
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To control the potential reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity problem, I 
use the city-sector level of innovation excluding the focal firm as an instrument. As the 
main objective is to study the effect of a time invariant regressor INNOVATION on 
firms’ leverage ratios, we performed the Hausman-Taylor IV method. It fits panel-data 
random-effects models in which some of the covariates are correlated with the 
unobserved individual-level random effect, which preserves the advantages of both 
estimators. The estimators were proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) and 
Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986). The identified effects of time invariant regressors are 
reported in Table 2.6.  
 From Table 2.6, we find that by controlling for the potential endogeneity of the 
innovation variable, the direct effect of innovation on leverage turns out to be 
significantly positive for state-owned firms in specifications (3) and (5) as well as in 
the overall regressions (1) and (2), suggesting a negative bias in the models when we 
do not consider the endogeneity issue. An unobserved innovation policy could 
generate this bias. On one hand, the policy might promote innovation within a firm; on 
the other hand, when too many innovative companies and projects apply for debt 
financing, the credit could be more difficult to approve. Under these circumstances, 
the interaction effect of innovation and profitability on leverage ratio is hard to predict 
in the regressions. Accounting for the endogeneity of innovation, the effect of 
innovation on leverage is significantly positive for all of the firms. In addition, the 
positive effect for state-owned companies is higher than for private firms by around 
12%. To check whether the result is robust or not, we also analyze with 2SLS method 
in Table 2.7. We find that the results agree with that of the Hauseman-Taylor 
Approach. 
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Table 2. 6 Hausman-Taylor Estimations 
 
Notes: Table 2.6 reports the results of the regressions with Hausman-Taylor Approach-The Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **,* denote significance at 1%. 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent variables: Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables All firms All firms State-owned Private State-owned Private 
Innovation 0.0568*** 0.0444*** 0.1683*** 0.0496*** 0.1629*** 0.0408*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0128) (0.0413) (0.0187) (0.0402) (0.0135) 
Innovation*Profitability 
 
-0.0288** 
  
-0.0280 -0.0325** 
  
(0.0145) 
  
(0.0546) (0.0153) 
Profitability -0.0005 0.0568* -0.1761** -0.0006 -0.1417 0.0641** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0290) (0.0887) (0.0020) (0.1126) (0.0307) 
Capital intensity 0.0001* 0.0001* -0.0001 0.0001* -0.0001 0.0001* 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Tangibility -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0031 -0.0003 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0134) (0.0004) (0.0133) (0.0004) 
Size -0.0087* -0.0055 -0.0501*** -0.0045 -0.0484*** -0.0023 
 
(0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0131) (0.0050) (0.0128) (0.0040) 
State_owned 0.0234 0.0193 
        
 
(0.0151) (0.0145) 
        
_cons 0.4936*** 0.4925*** 0.7180*** 0.4697*** 0.7122*** 0.4693*** 
 
(0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0819) (0.0269) (0.0811) (0.0265) 
N 3577 3577 759 2818 759 2818 
F 3.0921*** 2.9387*** 3.8879*** 2.5821*** 3.3298*** 2.7140*** 
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Table 2. 7 Two-stage IV regressions 
 
Notes: Table 2.7 reports the results of the 2SLS regressions without panel features. To control the 
potential endogeneity of innovation, we use the city-sector level of innovation excluding the focal firm 
as instrument. The results compare investigation of determinants of capital structure for firms in China 
for state-owned firms and private firms. The dependent variable for each column is firm-level leverage 
ratio. Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **,* denote significance at 1%. 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Dependent Variable: Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables All firms All firms State-owned Private State-owned Private 
Innovation 0.0204** 0.0209** 0.0958*** -0.0004 0.0959*** -0.0001 
 (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0240) (0.0099) (0.0241) (0.0100) 
Profitability -0.0010 0.0372 -0.2263*** -0.0012 -0.1825 0.0265 
 (0.0020) (0.0283) (0.0867) (0.0020) (0.1122) (0.0298) 
Capital intensity 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0000 0.0001** -0.0000 0.0001** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Tangibility -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0089 -0.0001 -0.0087 -0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0125) (0.0004) (0.0125) (0.0004) 
Size 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0284*** 0.0067* -0.0280*** 0.0068** 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0093) (0.0034) (0.0093) (0.0034) 
State owned 0.0146 0.0141     
 (0.0137) (0.0137)     
Innovation*Profitability  -0.0191   -0.0326 -0.0139 
  (0.0141)   (0.0531) (0.0149) 
Sector dummies  Yes   Yes Yes 
City dummies  Yes   Yes Yes 
_cons 0.4917*** 0.4906*** 0.6360*** 0.4779*** 0.6327*** 0.4769*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0626) (0.0251) (0.0628) (0.0251) 
N 3577 3577 759 2818 759 2818 
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2.6  Conclusions 
China is one of the biggest emerging economies undergoing reforms in its innovation 
policies as well as the financial system. On one hand, Chinese government has put 
forth various policies in promoting technological innovation capabilities; on the other 
hand, Chinese authorities also took the steps of reforming the financial system to 
increase its efficiency in allocating capital. The policies include allowing lending to 
private enterprises from the four state-owned commercial banks and recapitalizing 
non-performing loans to asset management companies. However, in my study, the 
results still suggest a striking difference between the debt financing patterns faced by 
state-owned and private firms.  
With firm-level panel data across 18 Chinese cities, I study the determinants of 
firm capital structure for Chinese state-owned and private firms. In addition, I 
investigate how innovation investment activity affects the capital structure for 
different types of firms in China. My study sheds light on the special features of the 
financial systems in China.  
  First, I find that the relation between profitability and future leverage is 
significantly negative, which agrees with the pecking order hypothesis and suggest 
that firms are facing financial constraints because the financial market is not perfect 
and information is not symmetric. The negative marginal effect is stronger for 
state-owned firms than for private firms. The less the profit in the current stage, the 
higher external loan financing state-owned firms need to get from the banks. Since the 
data reflect the leverage ratio in equilibrium, the result suggests that state-owned firms 
are still less financially constrained than private firms. 
 Second, I investigate how innovation - a type of investment highly sensitive to 
internal finance with uncertainty and risk, will affect the leverage ratios. By 
controlling the potential endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity with 
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Hausman-Taylor and 2SLS approach, both instrumental-variable regression analyses 
show that innovation has a positive impact on future leverage ratios especially for 
state-owned firms. When a firm has invested in innovation, its demand for finance will 
increase. However, since the state-owned firms have less default risk because of 
government protection and bailout policies, it will be easier for state-owned firms to 
receive funding from banks. Innovation will not exacerbate the financing condition for 
state-owned firms.  
 Last but not least, I study how innovation investment can impact the relation 
between profitability and leverage ratio. The point estimation in 2SLS and 
Hausman-Taylor Approach shows that innovation will strengthen the negative relation 
between profitability and leverage ratio.  
 The findings have reflected the transitional nature of the Chinese corporate 
environment. This is because the Chinese financial environment still maintains some 
features of a centrally planned economy as the state is still the principal stakeholder of 
firms. State-owned enterprises are less likely to run into financial problems compared 
with their counterparts in the private sector. Therefore, the negative relation between 
profitability and future leverage ratio is more prominent. While bank financing is still 
more costly than using retained earnings, if a state-owned firm depletes its internal 
finance, it will not be difficult for them to get access to external bank finance, which is 
not the case for private firms. On the other hand, certain firm-specific factors that 
affect firms’ leverage in the Western countries also affect Chinese firms’ leverage. 
Innovation, a type of risky investment facing with financial constraints, has a positive 
impact on future leverage ratio, particularly in Chinese state-owned firms. However, 
for private firms, the positive effect is not as strong as state-owned firms. The effect 
could be negative because a bank will be reluctant to finance a private firm without a 
long credit history and government protection. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this dissertation reveals a full picture of the relation between 
innovation and capital structure in the context of emerging economies. Whereas earlier 
research has primarily studied publicly-traded companies from the United States, my 
study highlights that the results for different types of samples may diverge, and the 
understanding of the interaction of innovation investments and corporate financial 
structures would benefit from explicit attention to the institutional settings in which 
firms are embedded.  
In the first chapter, I have shed new light on the effect of external finance on 
innovation investment decisions in Asian and Eastern European emerging economies. 
I find that external financing, especially funding from equity markets and from friends 
and family provide significant financial resources for firms’ innovation investments. 
Whereas the public equity markets are not mature in most of the analyzed economies, 
private equity financing still has a significant positive effect on innovation investment. 
I argue that financial development is a critical enabler of innovation in a broad set of 
service and manufacturing firms. What’s more, the political environment, 
characterized by the political constraints indicator, plays an important role in the 
relation between external finance and innovation. The more democratic a country, the 
stronger is the positive effect of finance on innovation.  
In the second chapter, I show that innovation can affect the future capital structure 
decisions in China. The primary findings have reflected the transitional nature of the 
Chinese corporate environment, which still maintains some features of a centrally 
planned economy as the state is still the principal stakeholder of many firms. 
State-owned enterprises are less likely to run into financial problems compared with 
their counterparts in the private sector. Therefore, the negative relation between 
profitability and future leverage ratio is more prominent. While bank financing is still 
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more costly than using retained earnings, if a state-owned firm depletes its internal 
finance, it will not be difficult for them to get access to external bank finance, which is 
not the case for private firms. On the other hand, certain firm-specific factors that 
affect firms’ leverage in the Western countries also affect Chinese firms’ leverage. 
Innovation, a type of risky investment affected by financial constraints, has a positive 
impact on future leverage ratio, particularly in Chinese state-owned firms. However, 
for private firms, the positive effect is not as strong as for state-owned firms. The 
effect may even be negative because a bank will be reluctant to finance a private firm 
that engages in risky innovation without a long credit history and government 
protection. 
The importance of equity financing on innovation is implied by the conclusion of 
Chapter 2 that the relationship between leverage and innovation is much weaker for 
private firms. As private firms are generally smaller and younger than state-owned 
firms with less potential bail out support from the government, they are facing stronger 
financing constraints from banks. Therefore, private firms have to seek financing 
support from equity markets. 
Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to the literature in studying financing of 
innovation. It deepens our understanding of the interaction among innovation, external 
financing and the overall capital structure. Empirically, this study contributes to the 
literature with micro evidence in the emerging-economy context.  
While the data based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey makes the study of the 
relation between innovation and finance possible, it is not without limitations. First, I 
do not have information on innovation year by year, which prevents me from doing a 
dynamic empirical analysis of the relation between innovation and finance. Second, it 
is hard to avoid the measurement errors in the process of conducting the surveys, 
which is beyond the control of the researchers. The biggest challenge in the research is 
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to control the endogeneity of the focal variables in the regression models. With 
instrumental-variable techniques, I resolve the issue in both chapters. The results are 
robust and mitigate the existing biases in the emerging economy context.  
The policy implications of this study can be summarized from two perspectives. 
The results of the first chapter emphasize the importance of transparent and efficient 
financial markets and institutions that reduce information asymmetries between 
innovators and potential investors. It also provides managerial insights regarding the 
financial challenges of innovation and building growth-oriented companies in 
emerging economies. Innovators are generally better off developing relationships that 
provide access to private equity investors rather than seeking investment funding from 
the commercial banking sector. For China, as studied in the second chapter, the results 
reveal that the financial reform of the banking system is far from efficient in terms of 
providing funding to innovation investment of private firms. The government should 
overcome the institutional legacy of the planned economy by encouraging changes in 
the attitudes and methods of work of the banking system so as to allow market forces, 
competition and the private sector to play a greater role. 
 Future research can be extended to compare the difference of the effect of finance 
on innovation from within countries and between countries. In addition, I am also 
interested in institutional characteristics other than political constraint which can 
moderate the relation between innovation and corporate structure.  
 
